Abstract. We i n troduce a new technique for constructing a family of universal hash functions.
Introduction
Message authentication. Message authentication is one of the most common cryptographic aims. The setting is that two parties, a signer S and veri er V , share a (short, random, secret) key, k. W h e n S wants to send V a message, x, S computes for it a message authentication code (MAC), MAC k (x), and S sends V the pair (x ). On receipt of (x 0 0 ), veri er V checks that MACV k (x 0 0 ) = 1 .
To describe the security of a message authentication scheme, an adversary E is given an oracle for MAC k ( ). The adversary is declared successful if she outputs an (x ) such that MACV k (x ) = 1 but x was never asked of the MAC k ( ) oracle. For a scheme to be \good," reasonable adversaries should rarely succeed. Software-efficient MACs. In the current computing environment it is often necessary to compute MACs frequently and over strings which are commonly hundreds to thousands of bytes long. Despite this, there will usually be no special-purpose hardware to help out: MAC generation and veri cation will need to be done in software on a conventional workstation or personal computer. So to reduce the impact of message authentication on the machine's overall performance, and to facilitate more pervasive use of message authentication, we n e e d t o d e v elop faster techniques. This paper provides one such t e c hnique. Two a p p r oaches to message authentication. The fastest software MACs in common use today are exempli ed by M A C k (x) = h(k k x k k), with h a (software-e cient) cryptographic hash function, such a s h =MD5 22] . Such methods are described in 30] . The algorithm HMAC 3 ] represents the most re ned algorithm in this direction. Schemes like these might seem to be about as software-e cient as one might realistically hope for: after all, we are computing one of the fastest types of cryptographic primitives over a string nearly identical in length to that which w e w ant to authenticate. But it is well-known that this reasoning is specious: in particular, Wegman and Carter 32] s h o wed back in 1981 that we d o n o t h a ve to \cryptographically" transform the entire string x.
In the Wegman{Carter approach c o m m unicating parties S and V share a secret key k = ( h P) which speci es both an in nite random string P and a function h drawn randomly from a strongly universal 2 family of hash functions H. ( Recall that H is strongly universal 2 if for all x 6 = x 0 , the random variable h(x) k h(x 0 ), for h 2 H , is uniformly distributed.) To authenticate a message x, the sender transmits h(x) xor-ed with the next piece of the pad P. The thing to notice is that x is transformed rst by a non-cryptographic operation (universal hashing) and only then is it subjected to a cryptographic operation (encryption), now applied to a much shorter string.
A standard cryptographic technique |the use of a pseudorandom function family, F| allows S and V to use a short string a in lieu of the in nite string P. Signer S now M A Cs the i th message, x i , with MAC (h a) (x i ) = ( i F a (i) h(x i )).
As it turns out, to make a g o o d M A C it is enough to construct something weaker than a strongly universal 2 family. Carter and Wegman 10] also introduced the notion of an almost universal 2 family, H. This must satisfy the weaker condition that Pr h2H h(x) = h(x 0 )] is small for all x 6 = x 0 . A s observed by Stinson 27] , an almost universal 2 family can easily be turned into an almost strongly universal 2 family by composing the almost universal 2 family with an almost strongly universal 2 one. In computing h 2 (h 1 (x)), where h 1 is drawn from an almost universal 2 family and h 2 is drawn from a strongly universal 2 one, the bulk of the time will typically be spent in computing h 1 (x), since x may be a long string but h 1 (x) will be a short string, and so h 2 won't have m uch w ork left to do. Thus the problem of nding a fast-to-compute MAC has e ectively been reduced to nding a family of almost universal 2 hash functions whose members are fast to compute. Bucket hashing. This paper provides a new almost universal 2 family of hash functions. We c a l l our hash family bucket hashing. It is distinguished by its member functions being extremely fast to compute|as few as 6 elementary machine instructions per word (independent o f w ord size) for the version of bucket hashing we concentrate on in this paper. Putting such a family of hash functions to work in the framework described above w i l l g i v e rise to an e cient s o f t ware MAC.
A bucket hash MAC w i l l i n volve signi cant o verhead beyond the time which i s s p e n t bucket hashing. For one thing, the output of bucket hashing is too long to use directly it will need to be composed with an additional layer of hashing. All the same, one can compare the instruction count mentioned above to that of MD5, which uses 36 instructions per 32-bit word 7] , and see that there is potential for substantial e ciency gains even if the true cost of using bucket hashing substantially exceeds 6 instructions/word.
A bucket hash MAC has advantages in addition to speed. Bucket hashing is a linear function |it is a special case of matrix multiplication over GF(2)| and this linearity yields many pleasant characteristics for a bucket hash MAC. In particular, bucket hashing is parallelizable, since each word of the hash is just the xor of certain words of the message. Bucket hashing is incremental in the sense of 4] with respect to both append and substitute operations. Finally, the only processor instructions a bucket hash needs are word-aligned load, store, a n d xor t h us a bucket hash MAC is essentially endian-indi erent.
In a bucket hash MAC |indeed in any W egman-Carter MAC| one is a orded the luxury of conservative (slow) cryptography e v en in a MAC whose software speed has been aggressively optimized. This is because one arranges that the time complexity for the MAC is dominated by the non-cryptographic work.
One might w orry that the linearity or simple character of bucket hashing might give rise to some \weakness" in a MAC which exploits it. But it does not. A bucket hash MAC, like a n y MAC which f o l l o ws the Wegman{Carter paradigm, enjoys the assurance advantages of provable security. Moreover, this provable security i s a c hieved under extremely \tight" reductions, so that an adversary who can successfully break the MAC can break the underlying cryptographic primitive (the pseudorandom function F) with essentially identical e ciency.
Previous work. The general theory of unconditional authentication was developed by Simmons see 26] for a survey. A s w e h a ve already explained, the universal-hash-and-then-encrypt paradigm is due to Wegman and Carter 32] . The idea springs from their highly in uential 10].
In Wegman{Carter authentication the size of the hash family corresponds to the number of bits of shared key|one reason to nd smaller families of universal hash functions than those of 10, 32]. Siegel (for other reasons) 25] constructs families of fast-to-compute hash functions which use few bits of randomness and have small description size. Stinson nds small hash families in 27], and also gives general results on the construction of universal hash functions. We exploit some of these ideas here. Subsequent improvements (rooted in coding theory) came from Bierbrauer, Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets 6], and Gemmell and Naor 12].
The above w ork concentrates on universal hash families and unconditionally-secure authentication. Brassard 9] rst connects the Wegman{Carter approach to the complexity-theoretic case. The complexity-theoretic notion for a secure MAC is a straightforward adaptation of the de nition of a digital signature due to Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest 14] . Their notion of an adaptive c hosen message attack is equally at home for de ning an unconditionally-secure MAC. Thus we view work like ours as making statements about unconditionally-secure authentication which g i v e rise to corresponding statements and concrete schemes in the complexity-theoretic tradition. To make this translation we regard a nite pseudorandom function (PRF) as the most appropriate tool. Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway 5 ] w ere the rst to formalize such objects, investigate their usage in the construction of e cient M A Cs, and suggest them as a desirable starting point for practical, provably-good constructions. Finite PRFs are a re nement of the PRF notion of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali 13] t o t a k e account of the xed lengths of inputs and outputs in the e cient primitives of cryptographic practice. Zobrist 33] gives a hashing technique which predates 10] and essentially coincides with one method from 10]. Arnold and Coppersmith 2] give a n i n teresting hashing technique which allows one to map a set of keys k i into a set of corresponding values v i using a table only slightly bigger than P i v i . The proof of our main technical result is somewhat reminiscent of their analysis.
Lai, Rueppel and Woolven 19], Taylor 28] , and Krawczyk 18 ] h a ve all been interested in computationally e cient M A Cs. The last two w orks basically follow the Wegman{Carter paradigm. In particular, Krawczyk obtains e cient message authentication codes from hash families which resemble traditional cyclic redundancy codes (CRCs), and matrix multiplication using Toeplitz matrices. Though originally intended for hardware, these techniques are fast in software, too. We recall Krawczyk's CRC-like hash in Section 2.
An earlier version of this paper appeared as 23]. Subsequent work. Shoup 24] has carried out implementations and analysis of hash function families akin to polynomial evaluation. Such hash functions make good candidates for \second level hashing" when a speed-optimized hash function is applied to a long string. The techniques are also fast enough to be gainfully employed all by themselves.
Halevi and Krawczyk describe a family of hash functions, MMH, which a c hieves extremely impressive software speeds on some modern platforms 15]. To a c hieve s u c h performance one needs the underlying hardware to be able to quickly multiply two 32-bit integers to form a 64-bit product.
Johansson investigates how to reduce the size of the key for bucket hashing, which, in the current paper, is quite enormous 16]. Organization. We continue in Section 2 by reviewing the de nition and basic properties of universal hash families. Sections 3 and 4 give our main result. In the former we formally de ne our family of hash functions, B w e state a theorem which upper bounds the collision probability of B and we discuss the e ciency of computing functions drawn from B. In the latter we prove our main theorem, relegating one lemma to Appendix A. Section 5 reviews the Wegman-Carter approach for making a MAC out of a family of universal hash functions, while Section 6 gives a concrete example of this and discusses some of the di culties involved in constructing a good MAC using bucket hashing. Section 7 considers some extensions and directions for our work.
Preliminaries
This section provides background drawn from Carter and Wegman 10, 32], Stinson 27] , and Krawczyk 18] . Proofs are omitted. The value of = max x6 =x 0fPr h h(x) = h(x 0 )]g is called the collision probability. For us, the principle measures of the worth of an AU 2 hash family are how small is its collision probability and how f a s t can one compute its functions.
To make a fast MAC one may wish to \glue together" various universal hash families. The following are the basic methods for doing this. Sometimes one needs a way to make the collision probability smaller. Let We end this section with a sample construction for a software-e cient A X U 2 hash family, this one due to Krawczyk 18] . Let n ` 1 b e n umbers and let m 2 f 0 1g n`b e the string we wish to hash. We c a n v i e w m as a polynomial m(x) o ver GF(2) of degree n`; 1 (or less) by viewing the bits of m as the coe cients of x n`;1 : : : x 2 x 1. We then de ne a family of hash functions K n `] = fh : f0 1g n`! f 0 1g`g as follows. A random hash function h 2 K is described by a random irreducible polynomial h over GF(2) of degree`. T o h a s h m using h we compute the degree`; 1 (or less) polynomial m(x) x`mod h(x). Viewing the coe cients of this polynomial as a string of length`gives us the hash function h evaluated at m.
The e ciency with which hash functions h 2 K can be computed has been studied by Shoup 24] (who also looked at related hash families). These functions are fast to compute| about 6 instructions/byte on a 32-bit machine, assuming`= 64, and ignoring the time to \preprocess" the function h. Still, for su ciently long messages, it will be faster to use the bucket hashing technique from the following section.
We comment that there are many other well-known techniques for universal hashing, such a s the linear congruential hash (modulo a prime) 10], the shift register hash 31], or the Toeplitz matrix hash 18].
Bucket Hashing
Let X = X 1 : : : X n be a string, partitioned into n words. To h a s h X using bucket hashing we will scatter the words of X into N \buckets," then XOR the contents of each bucket, and then concatenate the bucket contents.
Some ways of scattering the words of X work out better than others. In this paper we analyze a particular bucket hashing scheme, which w e denote by B. The scheme will depend on parameters n N w. S c heme B will scatter each w ord into three buckets.
De ning the bucket hash family B
F i x a w ord size w 1 and parameters n 1 a n d N 3. We will be hashing from domain D = f0 1g wn to range R = f0 1g wN . A s a t ypical example, take w = 3 2 , n = 1024, and N = 1 4 0 . If we w ant to be explicit, such a family would be denoted B 32 1024 140]. For the scheme we describe to make sense we require that ; N 3 n.
Each hash function h 2 B is speci ed by a length-n list of cardinality-3 subsets of f1 : : : N g. We denote this list by h = h 1 h n . The three elements of h i are written h i = fh i1 h i2 h i3 g.
Choosing a random h from B w n N] means choosing a random length-n list of three-element subsets of f1 : : : N g subject to the constraint that no two of these sets are the same. That is, we insist that h i 6 = h j for all i 6 = j.
Let h 2 B and let X = X 1 X n be the string we w ant to hash, where each jX i j = w. Then h(X) is de ned by the following algorithm. In pseudocode we h a ve:
The computation of a h(X) can be envisioned as follows. We h a ve N buckets, each initially empty. The rst word of X is thrown into the three buckets speci ed by h 1 . The second word of X is thrown into the three buckets speci ed by h 2 . And so on, with the last word of X being thrown into the three buckets speci ed by h n . Our N buckets now c o n tain a total of 3n words. Compute the xor of the words in each of the buckets (with the xor of no words being de ned as the zero-word).
The hash of X, h(X), is the concatenation of the nal contents of the N buckets.
Collision probability of the bucket hash family B
The collision probability for B w n N]. is the maximum, over all distinct x x 0 2 f 0 1g nw , of the probability that h(x) = h(x 0 ). Our main theorem gives an upper bound on the collision probability The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Section 4.
Plot of B(N). In Figure 1 we plot B(N) against N. Consulting the graph we see, for example, that if you hash a string down to 140 words the collision probability is about 2 ;31 .
Comments. In the applications of bucket hashing to message authentication one typically wants a collision probability of, say, 2 ;30 or less. As can be seen from Figure 1 , getting such a s m a l l collision probability requires a fairly large value of N. Since N is the length of our hashed string (in words), large values of N are undesirable and typically require additional layers of hashing. An example of this will be illustrated in Section 5.
Note that our bound shows no dependency on w or n (though there is the technical restriction that n ; N 3 =12). Indeed it is easy to see (and the proof of Theorem 7 will show) that the collision probability does not depend on w. In fact, it is a consequence of the proof that, when 4 n ; N 3 =12, the collision probability does not depend on n, either.
Observe that (N) = N=(N ; 36), where N = N(N;1)(N;2). By our assumption that N 32 we h a ve t h a t 1 (N) 1:002. So the multiplication by (N) can e ectively be ignored B(N) (N).
We believe that it is possible to relax the restriction n ; N 3 =12 all the way t o n < ; N
3
. H o wever, doing this would add considerable complexity to the proof, yet have relatively little practical value, since the number of buckets, N, needs to quite large in order to obtain what would usually be regarded as a suitably small collision probability. Explanation. Here is a bit of intuition for what is going on. Suppose an adversary wants to nd a pair of distinct messages x x 0 2 f 0 1g wn which are most likely to collide under a function from B. What two messages should she choose? In the proof of Theorem 7 we recast this question into the following one. An adversary will throw t triples of balls into N buckets. Each of the 3t balls will land in a random bucket, except for the following constraints: three distinct buckets are selected for the three balls of each toss and no tosses will land in identical triples of buckets. The adversary's goal is the following: make every bucket end up with an even number of balls in it. All the adversary can do is choose how many triples of balls, t, she will disperse. The question we must answer is: what choice of t, where 1 t n, will maximize the adversary's chance to win this game?
It is not hard to guess the right answer to this question: four. Here is an explanation. If the adversary tosses just one triple of balls into the buckets she can't possibly win: 3 buckets are guaranteed to have a n o d d n umber of balls. If she throws out two triples of balls she again can not win, thanks to the constraint that no two triples of balls land in identical triples of buckets. If she throws out three triples of balls she again can not win because 9 balls can't be distributed into buckets in such a w ay that every bucket has an even number of balls. If the adversary throws out four triples of balls then, nally, she has a chance to win. This seems like it ought t o b e t h e b e s t thing for the adversary to do, because it would seem to become increasingly unlikely to get every bucket to have a n e v en number of balls when more balls get tossed into the N buckets. Though this intuition is a long way from being formal, four triples of balls does turn out to be the right answer. Translating back i n to the adversary's original goal, the adversary can do no better than to choose messages X and X 0 which di er by exactly 4 words: for X these words are, say, 0 w , while for X 0 these words are, say, 1 w .
3.3 The e ciency of the bucket hash family B Instruction counts. To get a feel for the e ciency of bucket hashing, let us do some approximate instruction counts for computing a function h 2 B . Though instruction counting is an extremely crude predictor of speed, an analysis like this is still a good implementation-independent way t o get some feel for our method's potential e ciency.
To construct a good MAC w e will probably want a collision probability o f 2 ;30 (perhaps less) and so, in view of Figure 1 , we will be using a reasonably large value of N, s a y N 120. Thus we will be needing more buckets than can be accommodated by a t ypical machine's register set.
There are then two natural strategies to hash the string X = X 1 : : : X n , where each X i is a word of the machine's basic word size:
Method-1 (Process words X 1 : : : X n ). We can read each X i from memory (in sequence) and then, three times: (1) load from memory the value Y j of the appropriate bucket j (2) compute X i Y j (3) store this back i n to memory, modifying Y j . T otal instruction count is 10 instructions per word (4 reads, 3 writes, 3 xors).
Method-2 (Fill buckets Y 1 : : : Y N ). We can xor together all words that should wind up in bucket 1 then xor all words that go into bucket 2 and so forth, for each of the N buckets.
We will need a total of 3n reads into X 1 : : : X n , p l u s 3 n ; N xor operations (assuming each bucket contains at least one word). Depending on what we w ant done with the hash, we m a y need another N writes to put the hash value back i n to memory. So the total instruction count is about 6 instructions per word. Achieving the stated instruction counts requires the use of self-modifying code (\sm-code") in e ect, we implicitly assumed that the representation of h 2 B is the piece of executable code which computes h. In implementation, this can be tricky. I f w e don't want to use self-modifying code (\sm-code") we will need to load from memory the bucket locations (Method-1) or word location (Method-2). This would add 3 loads per word. For Method 2, sm-code would further increase the instruction count because of the overhead needed to control the looping: it is h-dependent h o w many w ords will fall into a given bucket, so this will have to be read from memory, and loopunrolling may be di cult. Assuming an additional one instruction per word to account for this work, we h a ve the following approximate instruction counts: implementation instrs/wd We h a ve not studied these tradeo s in detail and do not know if bucket hashing will eventually \win out" in the choice of hash techniques for making a practical MAC.
Proof of the Main Theorem
In this section we p r o ve Theorem 7. Throughout this section x values of n and N satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Our rst two claims show h o w to simplify the setting.
One can assume a word length of w = 1 . First we argue that, without loss of generality, w e can assume that the word length for B w n N] i s w = 1 . I n tuitively, this follows from the \bitwise" character of bucket hashing: when we h a s h X 1 X n down to Y 1 Y N , where jX i j = jY j j = w, 
}
Given what we h a ve just shown, we henceforth assume a word length as w = 1 . W e will use B as shorthand for B 1 n N ]. Exploiting linearity. For 0 t n, l e t 1 t = 1 t 0 n;t and let 0 = 0 N . F or 0 < t n de ne t = Pr h2B h(1 t ) = 0] :
We are trying to bound , the collision probability o f B, which is the maximum, over all distinct x x 0 2 f 0 1g n , o f P r h2B h(x) = h(x 0 )]. We use Claim 8 and the structure of bucket hashing Thus we d o n ' t h a ve to think about the probability of distinct strings colliding it is simpler and more convenient to think about the probability that a non-zero string gets hashed to 0. Let N = N(N ; 1)(N ; 2). Let P ij denote the transition probability o f M: the probability o f of moving from state i to state j in a single step. To capture the process C we h a ve described we need to de ne M's transition probabilistic as follows: This is a list of t + 1 n umbers, each i n f0 N g, and it encodes the sequence of states in M one passes through on hashing 1 t according to h = h 1 h 2 h t .
Let Distinct(h 1 h t ) b e true if h 1 : : : h t are all distinct, and false otherwise. Let R t (\random") be the uniform distribution on h 1 h t (that is, each h i is a random triple of distinct points from f1 : : : N g).
Let D t (\distinct") be the uniform distribution on distinct h 1 : : : h t (that is, each h i is a random triple of distinct points from f1 : : : N g, and no two of these triples are identical).
Let C(m t) denote the probability of at least one collision in the experiment of throwing t balls, independently and at random, into m bins.
We are now ready to prove the lemma. To formalize the above argument, let f i (t) denote the maximum, over all initial states s, of the probability that we a r r i v e i n s t a t e i in exactly t transitions, given that we start in state s. This is the same as the supremum, over all distributions on the starting state of M, of the probability that we arrive in state i in exactly t transitions, given that we start in an initial state as chosen by sampling from . W e will need the following lemma about the behavior of Markov c hain M. The proof is a tedious but straightforward calculation using the transition probabilities of M. I t i s relegated to Appendix A. The point isn't the speci c formula, but only that f 0 (6) is less than half B(N) for all su ciently large N.
Lemma 12 Assume 6 t n. T h e n t B(N).
Proof : W e use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 10. where E and are de ned by xing some h 7 h t which maximize the probability a b o ve a n d then letting = Parity(h 7 h t ) and letting E be the uniform distribution on h 1 h 6 subject to h 1 : : : h 6 being distinct from all of h 7 : : : h t and distinct from each other. Continuing, the above expression is: The rst argument t o M A C a n d M A CV will usually be written as a subscript. We demand that for any x 2 Messages, k 2 Keys, and cnt 2 f 1 : : : MAXg, M A CV k (x MAC k (x cnt)) = 1 .
Let M be a message authentication scheme. A MAC oracle MAC k ( ) f o r M behaves as follows:
it answers its rst query, x 1 , with MAC k (x 1 1) it answers its second query, x 2 , with MAC k (x 2 2) and so forth. The MAC oracle responds with the empty string to queries beyond the MAX th or to queries not in the set Messages.
An adversary E for a message authentication scheme M is an algorithm equipped with a MAC oracle MAC k ( ). Adversary E is said to forge on a particular execution, this execution having MAC oracle MAC k ( ), if E outputs a string (x ) where MACV k (x ) = 1 y et E made no oracle query of x . When we s p e a k o f E forging with a particular probability, that probability is taken over E's coin tosses and a random key k 2 Keys for the MAC oracle. Running times are measured in a standard RAM model of computation, with oracle queries counting as one step. By convention, the running time of E also includes the size of E's description.
One can also provide the adversary with a MACV k ( ) oracle, but this leaves the notion essentially unchanged.
The Wegman-Carter Construction. Given a family of hash functions H = fA ! f 0 1g b g we wish to construct from it a MAC. In the scheme we denote WC H], the Signer and Veri er share a random element h 2 H , a s w ell as an in nite random string P = P 1 P 2 P 3 , where jP i j = b. The pair (h P) is the key shared by the Signer and Veri er. The signer maintains a counter, cnt, which is initially 0. To generate a MAC for the message x the signer increments cnt and then computes the MAC = ( c n t P cnt h(x)) which authenticates x. T o v erify a MAC = ( i s) for the message x the Veri er checks if s = P i h(x).
The following theorem says that it is impossible (regardless of time, number of queries, or amount o f M A Ced text) to forge with probability exceeding the collision probability. Proposition 14 Let H = fh : A ! f 0 1g b g be a n -AXU 2 family of hash functions. Let T H denote the time required t o c ompute a representation of a random element h 2 H , and let T h (q ) denote the time required t o c ompute from this representation the hash of q strings, these strings totaling bits. Let F : f0 1g f 0 1g l ! f 0 1g b be a n 0 (t q)-secure nite PRF. Let E be an adversary which, in time t, makingueries, these queries totaling bits, forges with probability against the scheme WC H F ]. Then + 0 (t + t q + 1 ) , w h e r e t = O(T h (q ) + T H + ql+ qb).
The value of t would usually be insigni cant compared to t. Note that in Proposition 13 the forging probability is independent of the number of queries (q) and the length of the queried messages ( ). In Proposition 14 the forging probability depends on these quantities only insofar as they are detrimental to the security of the underlying PRF.
We emphasize that the Signer is stateful in the schemes WC H] and WC H F ]. The Signer being stateful improves security (compared with using a random index) and at little practical cost. Note that the Veri er is not stateful. This is possible because our notion of MAC security (Section 5), does not credit the adversary for \replay a t t a c ks."
6 Toy Example, and Limitations on Bucket Hashing
In this section we describe a concrete MAC based on the ideas presented so far. This is only a \toy" example doing a good job at specifying a software-optimized bucket hash MAC w ould involve m uch design, experimental, and theoretical work which w e h a ve not carried out. Still, the example helps to illustrate the strengths of bucket hashing in making a MAC, as well as the limitations. instructions per word (Section 3.3), hash using h 2 2 K in 24 instruction per word ( 24] ), and compute F with 600 instructions (easy to accomplish), then we will spend 10 + (142=1024) 24 + 600=1024 = 10 + 3:3 + 0 :6 = 1 3 :9 instructions/word.
Notice that the \cryptographic" contribution to the above time (i.e., the time to compute F) is very small. In a Wegman-Carter MAC one is a orded the luxury of conservative (and slow) cryptography e v en in an aggressively speed-optimized design. This is because one arranges that the time to compute the MAC is dominated by the non-cryptographic work. Limitations on bucket hashing. If the strings we a r e M A Cing are short then, at some point, it makes sense to switch strategies and stop using bucket hashing. In our TOY-MAC, w e might hash with only h 2 when the input string has length less than some constant. This is an important limitation on bucket hashing because the output length is substantial, the technique is simply not useful until the strings to be hashed get long enough. As a consequence, any \real" MAC which employs bucket hashing would likely be a patchwork of di erent t e c hniques for di erent message lengths. Therefore a real bucket hash MAC is unlikely to be simple to describe or implement. On the other hand, if the strings to be hashed are very long then, at some point, it makes sense to break the input into blocks and independently bucket has each b l o c k, using the construction of Proposition 2. This is because the size of the description of h 2 B grows linearly in the maximal length string which h can hash. We d o n o t w ant hash functions with excessively long descriptions (certainly the hash function should t in cache). This is another limitation on the bucket hashing technique, and something which will further complicate the de nition of any real bucket hash MAC.
In our TOY-MAC, i f w e w anted a substantially better collision probability w e could apply the construction of Proposition 3, but this would roughly halve the rate for bucket hashing, and perhaps other techniques might then be faster. This is a third limitation on bucket hashing: until better constructions are found, obtaining an extremely small collision probability, s a y 2 ;50 , w ould require an excessive n umber of buckets. That is, the output length of the hash function would be very long, and so the technique would only be useful for hashing extremely long messages.
The last limitation we will mention is the time needed to compute a description of h. I n a n y real MAC s c heme the function h 2 B would be determined from some underlying key k with the help of a pseudorandom generator. Because the description of h is large and of a special form, computing h might take a signi cant amount of time. In most applications of fast message authentications, a one-time key pre-processing delay is not important. But if there is a limited amount of text to be MACed, or if the latency of the rst MAC m ust be minimized, than the time to compute the description of h could be an issue. One approach i s t o n d a v ersion of bucket hashing that uses a small key (ie., a short description for h). This way the underlying pseudorandom generator (if present) is less taxed. This approach has been investigated by 1 6 ], who achieves a major reduction in the size of the description the h.
Balanced against these limitations is the possibility of extremely high MAC throughput, at least for long strings.
Extensions and Directions
Generalizing B, w e call by \bucket hashing" any s c heme in which the hash function h is a given by a l i s t h 1 h n of \small" subsets of f1 : : : N g and the hash of X = X 1 X n , where jX i j = w, is:
for j 1 to N do Y j 0 w for i 1 to n do for each k 2 h i do
In the general case the distribution on h-values is arbitrary. S o B is just the special case in which we use the uniform distribution on distinct triples in f1 : : : N g.
One could imagine many alternative distributions, some of which w i l l g i v e rise to faster-tocompute hash functions or better bounds on the collision probability. As an example, suppose h 2 H is chosen by randomly re-ordering a list h 1 h n of triples which are chosen so that for all sets I f 1 : : : n g of cardinality 2 or 4, it is not the case that the multiset h2I h has an even number of each point 1 : : : N . This new family of hash functions may h a ve substantially smaller collision probability than B for a given n N.
The bucket hash scheme of a graph. Hash family B would have been more e cient had each word gone into two buckets instead of three. One way t o s p e c i f y a s c heme where each w ord lands in two buckets is with a graph G whose N vertices comprise the N buckets and whose m edges f1 : : : m g indicate the pairs of buckets into which a w ord may fall. A random hash function from the family is given by a random permutation on f1 : : : m g. T o hash a string X 1 : : : X n using , where jX i j = w and n m, each w ord X i is dropped into the two buckets at the endpoints of edge (i). As before, we xor the contents of each bucket and output their concatenation in some canonical order. We call the above s c heme the bucket hash of the graph G. For a graph G to be \good" we w ant a small number of vertices N, a large number of edges m, and such that for all k where 1 k n m, i f k distinct edges are selected at random from G, then the probability that their union (with multiplicities) comprises a union of cycles is at most some tiny n umber . to get the transition probability P ij .
A Proof of Lemma 11
Here we p r o ve Lemma 11, giving a suitable upper bound on f 0 (6). We do this by direct calculation, paying attention to the states 0 1 2 3 4 6 and \everything else." To that end, let R = f5 7 8 : : : N g (i.e., \everything else") and de ne f R (t) to be the maximum, over all initial states s, of the probability that we a r r i v e at a state r 2 R in exactly t transitions, given that we start in state s. Let us write P Rj for P r2R P rj . Keep in mind that R is not a state of any Markov c hain we h a ve de ned this is just a convenient shorthand.
We will establish the bounds indicated in Figure 4 , where row t, column i is the upper bound we show for f i (t). To s e e h o w these bounds are computed, refer to Figure 3 , which depicts the relevant transition probabilities of M.
We start with the trivial bounds: f 1 (1) 1, f 3 (1) 1, f R (1) 1, f 4 (2) 1, and f 2 (6) 1. These are obvious, since each f i (t) represents a probability. Now refer to Figure 3 and calculate. Some of the mundane arithmetic is omitted. In cases such as the calculation of f 6 (4), the nal inequality is easily seen to hold for su ciently large N the crossover point w as determined numerically. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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